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The war in the Persian Gulf has reemphasized the importance of
United States military preparedness, even in times of peace. During war-
time, it may be easier for military contractors to justify the costs of re-
searching and developing newer, more exotic, "smarter" weapons systems.
Now that the current crisis has passed in its technical sense, many in
Congress may "shift gears" and attempt to reallocate expenditures from a
war-driven economy to one associated with a time of peace. Even the eu-
phoria of victory in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti theatre and feelings of "patriotism"
identified therewith will probably not protect the defense industry from
increased public scrutiny. Budget cuts required by Gramm-Rudman will
place an even greater pressure on defense contractors to compete for in-
creasingly scarce government funds. The pressure to survive may increase
the temptation to engage in fraudulent procurement practices, not un-
known in this area. Whether contractors succumb to this temptation de-
pends upon a number of factors, including individual corporate resolve,
commitment to ethics, and government review.'
The purpose of this Article is to present an overview of the ethics
* Copyright 1991, Paul E. Fiorelli, J.D., M.B.A., Associate Professor of Accounting and
Law, Xavier University.
Apart from the current situation in the Middle East, one by-product of the decrease in
political tension between East and West should be a corresponding decrease in military
expenditures. The circumstances seemed clearer prior to Iraq's invasion of neighboring Ku-
wait and the current unrest in the Soviet Union. Regardless of problems in the rest of the
world, it will become increasingly difficult to justify military growth in light of the current
emphasis on reducing the deficit.
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process in the defense industry, and suggest appropriate self-policing pol-
icies to maximize the probability of compliance. Although current reme-
dies are in need of improvement, the government and private citizens will
not hesitate to use the available sanctions, including but not necessarily
limited to: (1) fines; (2) imprisonment; (3) suspension; (4) debarment; and
(5) qui tam actions.2
I. PACKARD COMMISSION
In 1985, President Reagan formed the Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management ("Packard Commission") to address a fundamental
breakdown of the entire military procurement process.3 This was partially
in response to sensationalized spare parts aberrations. Even prior to the
current thaw in the "Cold War," it was difficult for Congress to support
military spending increases with the press reporting airborne toilet seat
covers costing the taxpayer $1,900 apiece."
Summarizing, the Packard Commission found legitimate cause for
dissatisfaction with the process by which the Department of Defense
("DoD") and Congress purchase military equipment and material. The
Commission strongly disagreed, however, with the commonly held views
of what is wrong in the procurement process and the approach to be used
in fixing it. The nation's defense programs, so said the Commission, lose
far more to inefficient procedures than to fraud and dishonesty. The truly
deleterious impediments were found to be overcomplicated organization
and rigid procedure, not avarice or connivance among the members of the
defense industry.5
The Packard Commission's Interim Report of February 1986 called
There is a wealth of material addressing problems associated with government con-
tracting, and fraud in particular. See generally Barletta & Pollack, Civil Litigation of Alle-
gations of Fraud in Connection with Government Contract Claims, 18 PUB. CONT. L.J. 235
(1988); Blum & Lobaco, Following the Money, 7 CAL. LAW. 36 (1987); Coburn & Sinchak,
Federal Procurement in the Federal Courts 1987-88: A Selective Review, 19 Pua. CONT. L.J.
14 (1989); Fennell, Government Contract Fraud, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427 (1988); Overly,
Government Contractors, Beware: Civil and Criminal Penalties Abound for Defective Pric-
ing, 20 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 597 (1987); Pitt, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liabil-
ity: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Coduct, 697 PRAC. L. INST. 319 (1990). For a fine
analysis of the impact of recent federal legislation in this area, see Donaldson, Section Six
of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1988: A New Ethical Stan-
dard in Government Contracting?, 20 CUMB. L. REV. 421 (1990).
' See Mayer, Military Procurement: Basic Principles and Recent Developments, 21 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 165 (1987) (events leading to formation of Packard Commission).
' See Cincinnati Enquirer, July 26, 1990, at A8, col. 1. Even though the public and the press
focused on spare parts abuses, the Packard Commission felt that this was not a fundamental
cause of the problem.
5 AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGE-
MENT (PACKARD COMMISSION) 15 (1966).
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for defense contractors to perform more self-policing, and increase their
efforts in the area of business ethics. The Commission stated bluntly: "To
assure that their houses are in order defense contractors must promulgate
and vigilantly enforce codes of ethics that address the unique problems
and procedures incident to defense procurement. They must also develop
and implement internal controls to monitor these codes of ethics and sen-
sitive aspects of contract compliance." 6 Prior to the Commission's 1986
Final Report, thirty-three defense contractors became signatories of what
is now known as the "Defense Industry Initiative" ("DII"). The DII was
divided into two parts. The first called for contractors to adopt codes of
ethics, train employees in the area of business ethics, and provide
"whistleblower" reporting mechanisms (i.e., hotlines and/or ombudsmen).
The second part called for increased public accountability. Signatories
were to complete a questionnaire intended to measure their implementa-
tion of the ethical principles. These questionnaires would then be audited
by an outside, independent agency and the results made public. They also
agreed to participate in a "Best Practices Forum," whereby they could
exchange useful information about their individual ethics programs. Fi-
nally, they agreed to make all of this information available to their re-
spective boards of directors.
II. PROCUREMENT PRACTICES PRE- AND POST-PACKARD COMMISSION
The Packard Commission changed the way that many large contrac-
tors addressed the ethics question. All thirty-four signatories of the DII
agreed to answer a questionnaire which would be analyzed by an external,
independent body. In 1987, the Ethics Resource Center was chosen to
perform this task. Defense industry experts Bedingfield and Stagliano
have expanded on the work of the Ethics Resource Center by analyzing
the actions of the signatories before the Packard Commission's interim or
final report.7 Although all thirty-four companies completed the Ethics
Resource Center survey, only eighteen completed the Bedingfield study.'
Even though the Bedingfield report concluded that the DII has had
an impact on how signatories procedurally carry out business ethics com-
pliance, the DII has received mixed reviews. Senator Warner (R. Virginia)
stated "[T]he defense industry is to be congratulated . . . [I]n my
view, . . .this industry has accomplished more in ... promoting ethical
6 Id. at 21.
' See Bedingfield, A Developing Picture of Business Ethics and Accountability: The De-
fense Industry Initiative, 1990 AM. GOV'T ACCT. J. 59 (1990).
The results of both studies are as follows:
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decision-making . . . than any other industry of which I am aware."9
While this may be true, it is interesting to note that the DII was adopted
shortly after the Packard Commission's February 1986 Interim Report.
The DII did comply with Commission recommendations, but it may have
been a ploy to diffuse the movement in Congress to seek stricter guide-
lines for defense contractors. Since the DII is voluntary and only a frac-
tion of the military contractors are signatories, Defense Department regu-
lations require that defense contractors with government contracts in
excess of $5 million must either follow the DII or post signs listing gov-
ernment hotline telephone numbers."0
Other members of Congress have not been as complimentary as Sen-
ator Warner. Representative Pat Schroeder (D. Colorado) stated: "Maybe
we ought to stop talking about self-policing. We're kidding ourselves."'1
Representative Les Aspin (D. Wisconsin) said: "To some, it appears 'self
governance' is really a public relations strategy."'" The Packard Commis-
sion called for more self-policing, and less government regulation. A gov-
ernment initiative in this area, Operation "Ill Wind," demonstrates the
potential problems with this recommendation.
III. OPERATION "ILL WIND"
Operation "Ill Wind" is an ongoing probe of the defense industry,
focusing on the role that consultants played in obtaining large military
contracts for certain defense contractors. Ill Wind has already led to
thirty-two guilty pleas and two trials with three guilty verdicts.13 Some
QUESTION PRE-PACKARD POST-PACKARD
1. Does your company have a written code of 18/18 = 100% 34/34 = 100%
ethics?
2. Were codes distributed to all employees? 9/18 = 50% 31/34 = 92%
3. Does your company provide all employees with 8/18 = 44% 33/34 = 97%
training on the code?
4. Are new employees provided with orientation to 9/18 = 50% 33/34 = 97%
the code?
5. Does your company have a Review board, 9/18 = 50% 34/34 = 100%
ombudsman, or ethics officer?
6. Does your company have a procedure for 6/18 = 33% 34/34 = 100%
voluntary disclosure?
Stamper, If We Are Smart ... , LIV. No. 24 VITAL SPEECHES, 751-52 (1988) (quoting from
the May 26, 1988 Congressional Record).
0 See DoD FAR 203.7001 (1990).
" Read, Defense Contractors' Ethics Programs Get Scrutinized, Wall St. J., July 21, 1988,
at 4, col. 1.
" Id.
Smart, Look What Ill Wind is Blowing In, Bus. WK., Apr. 16, 1990, at 27. Only two
acquittals were associated with Ill Wind prosecutions. Id.
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congressional skepticism of the Packard Commission's call for less gov-
ernment regulation is understandable in light of the fact that many of
these pleas have come from DII signatories, including Unisys, Teledyne,
Boeing, Hughes, Grumman, and Raytheon.
1 4
Ethics enforcement becomes even more difficult when dealing with
the blurred lines caused by the close relationship between contractors,
consultants, and the military. "In this industry, the regulators and the
regulated are friends. They served in the military together and they
worked together. Sometimes in the name of getting the job done, they
engaged in some 'collaborative noncompliance.' "" When there are bil-
lions of dollars and many thousands of jobs riding on who receives de-
fense contracts, it is not surprising that even some high-ranking govern-
ment officials are involved in scandals. Prosecutors are currently
investigating the role Melvyn Paisley, former Navy acquisition chief
turned consultant, might have played in the awarding of military weapon
systems to United Technologies and Unisys.16
The number of DII signatories has increased from thirty-four in
1986, to forty-six in 1989.11 These forty-six contractors answered two new
questions that were specific to Operation Ill Wind. These questions were
designed to "call attention to the important issues of marketing practices
and the use of consultants."'" Forty-five companies affirmatively an-
swered the question: "Does the company have a code of conduct provision
or associated policy addressing marketing activities?" Forty-four agreed
that their company's had "a code of conduct provision or associated pol-
icy requiring that consultants are governed by, and oriented regarding,
the company's code of conduct and relevant associated policies."' 9 The
overwhelming positive response to the two new questions shows the com-
mitment of signatories to attempt to prevent similar "ill winds" from
blowing in the future.
Even though Operation Ill Wind demonstrated that becoming a DII
signatory does not guarantee a company will act ethically, it must be
pointed out that neither can increased governmental regulation make
that claim. The Packard Commission recognized it would be cost-prohibi-
tive to hire the number of regulators necessary to detect most government
fraud and waste.2" Implementation and institutionalization of the pro-
14 Id.
" Read, supra note 11, at 4 (quoting Gary Edwards, Director of the Ethics Resource
Center).
6 See Smart, supra note 13, at 27.
'- See DEFENSE INDUSTRY INITIATIVE ON BUSINESS ETHICS AND CONDUCT, 1989 ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO THE PUBLIC AND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 5 (1990).
IS Id. at 26.
'" Id. at 26-27.
20 See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,
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posed Packard Commission guidelines, along with continued government
supervision, is a better strategy for decreasing future violations. This pre-
supposes that top management is truly committed to ethics-by its
deeds, not only by its words. Ethical training and codes of conduct mean
little when management sets unrealistic goals which employees believe
can only be accomplished by using questionable tactics.21
IV. CONTRACTORS' COMMITMENT TO ETHICS
Defense contractors should develop codes of ethics and conduct
training to show employees that they are serious about the moral implica-
tions of their actions.2 2 Top management must be willing to lose some
business in the short run, if the only way to get that business is unethical
or illegal actions. Defense contractors should establish methods of report-
ing violations that do not penalize the reporter. All too often contractors
"kill the messenger" by painting the whistleblower, usually an employee
of the contractor itself, as a malcontent who is not a "team player."
Whistleblowers must be encouraged to report violations, and not be pun-
ished for acting as the corporation's conscience. Whistleblowers, along
with internal auditors, are among the most effective ways that contractors
have for detecting potential violations.
A. Internal Auditing
The Packard Commission called for an increased role for internal au-
ditors in the ethics review process.2 3 In 1985, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co. ("Peat Marwick") conducted a survey of 250 defense contractors re-
garding this question.2' Eighty-five percent of the contractors responded,
representing approximately $90 billion of annual government sales for
1985. 2' The Peat, Marwick report concluded that there was room for sig-
nificant improvement regarding internal auditors participation in ethics
QUEST FOR EXCELLENCE 77 (1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (conclusions of the Packard
Commission).
" See generally Fiorelli, Winking Through The Blindfold: What Motivates the White-Col-
lar Criminal?, 21 AKRON L. REv. 327, 328 (1988) (further explanation of what motivates
employees to act illegally unethically and strategy for employer's action to counter
problems).
22 See Pitt, supra note 2, passim (guideline for corporate codes of conduct to minimize civil
and criminal liability).
" See FINAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 81.
" Peat, Marwick's survey began: "For the purposes of this survey, the internal audit func-
tion has been defined to include any regular or special examination conducted by or on
behalf of a company's management to assess the extent of compliance with the company's
established policies, procedures, and systems of internal controls." FINAL REPORT, supra
note 20, at 277, 287 (report on survey of defense contractors' internal audit processes).
25 See id. at 283.
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compliance:
Over one-quarter of the business units surveyed had no formal internal au-
dit function; over two-thirds had no such function at their operating levels.
Seven in ten indicated that they rely for audit coverage, in whole or in part,
on the work of independent accountants and on government auditors. Given
the added degree of effort needed to monitor government contract work,
internal audit staffs are too small: fifty-eight percent of the business units
surveyed had fewer than ten internal auditors, and almost two-thirds re-
ported that their internal audit staffs do not complete a full cycle of
auditable areas within a three year period.26
The Peat Marwick study reported that government access to internal
auditors' reports and working papers may not be conducive for auditors
candor and objectivity. 27 The report recommended that the DoD facilitate
strong internal auditing by randomly using investigative subpoenas to
compel disclosure of this information.28
The Packard Commission expressed some concern about the impact
of governmental audits on the internal audit functions of contractors. The
Commission believed that this could cause the internal auditor to become
complacent, or even create a "game-like" relationship whereby the con-
tractors will see how much they can get away with. The Commission went
on to state:
Intensive federal regulation has not only increased costs and lead-time, but
may have decreased the sense of individual and corporate responsibility for
the quality of products and services delivered to the federal government.
The standard of ethical business conduct seems to have become regulatory
compliance, rather than responsible decision making. In areas where these
are not coincidental or where regulations do not dictate conduct, the man-
agement conscience may fail. The sense of moral agency and ethical respon-
sibility may be overridden by the 'gamesmanship' attitude fostered by regu-
latory adversarialism .... Whatever actions the present Administration or
the Congress may take to improve the effectiveness of federal regulations
and oversight activities, serious attention must be paid to the inherent limi-
tations and possible counter-productivity of an approach that is almost en-
tirely a matter of external policing.2"
Increased involvement of internal auditors in the self-policing pro-
cess should be one important piece of the puzzle in improving ethics com-
pliance. Once management is made aware of violations, either by
whistleblowers or internal auditors, the next step should be to disclose
this information to the government.
20 Id. at 86.
27 Id. at 87.
28 Id. at 88.
29 Id. at 88-89.
34 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 2
B. Voluntary Disclosure
The Packard Commission believed that additional money spent on
hiring more government auditors would not address the problem of con-
tractor abuse as well as self-policing and voluntary disclosure.30 Contrac-
tors are doing a better job training their employees in business ethics and
detecting code violations, but they are still weary about reporting these
violations to the government. They fear that the disclosure will result in
an investigation, possible fines, imprisonment, suspension or debarment.
Whereas contractors should not be rewarded for correcting their own
problems, neither should they be punished harshly merely to set an ex-
ample for the rest of the defense industry. If they are treated the same as
non-disclosers, the signal is sent not to disclose violations and take a
chance that government auditors will not detect the problem. Assuming
the contractor has detected the abuse, thoroughly investigated the prob-
lem, disciplined the violators and accurately reported the information to
the government, before they became aware of an independent government
investigation of the matter, contractors should be shown some leniency.
This point would be reinforced if the government reserved its harshest
sanctions for contractors which were aware of the problem, and neither
corrected, nor disclosed the violation.
C. Sanctions
Prior to 1980, when government auditors detected overpricing they
merely sought to recover the money. 1 During the 1980's auditors began
to crack down and referred matters to the Department of Justice for
criminal prosecution. This can have an immediate impact on the contrac-
tor because after the indictment, the DoD normally suspends a contractor
from competing for additional contracts.
Suspension is usually a temporary matter, not lasting longer than one
year.2 Defense Department officials can suspend a contractor "on the ba-
sis of adequate evidence" of a violation.3 3 The DoD has interpreted this
to mean that once there is sufficient evidence to indict, there is adequate
evidence to suspend. Debarment is more permanent in nature and may
last up to three years.3 ' While suspension may occur after an indictment,
debarment occurs after a criminal conviction for fraud or waste.
The DoD has demonstrated an increased willingness to aggressively
use these sanctions against contractors. In 1980, the DoD suspended and/
30 Id. at 77.
Id. at 286.
3 See DoD FAR 9.407-1 (1990).
33 Id.
34 Id. 9.406-4.
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or debarred seventy-eight contractors. In 1985, the number increased to
652.15 This eight-fold increase in suspensions and debarments has in all
likelihood increased the tension and suspicion between contractors and
the DoD. Many defense-industry contactors believe that the DoD im-
properly uses automatic suspensions as a tool to coerce them into enter-
ing guilty pleas in order to avoid the draconian effect of a debarment.
The Packard Commission's findings addressed this matter, stating:
There is concern that DoD has improperly concluded that the fact of a
criminal indictment of a contractor or a management employee is an 'auto-
matic' ground for actions already taken. Such claimed abuses are said not
only to constitute arbitrary denials of protected personal and property
rights, but also to eliminate as the criteria for suspension, the measure of a
contractors 'present' responsibility.36
The Packard Commission was concerned that automatic suspension
upon indictment created distrust between the DoD and its contractors.
3 7
There was also apprehension that contractors were being severely pun-
ished for past actions without having their current actions taken into ac-
count. The Packard Commission called for a reexamination of DoD regu-
lations, particularly FAR 9.407-2(b), to give some credit to companies
that were presently operating in an ethically responsible manner, while
reserving suspension and debarment for those lacking in such behavior. 3s
D. Qui Tam Awards
One additional weapon in the arsenal against contracting fraud is the
qui tam action. The qui tam procedure allows private plaintiffs 9 to sue
government contractors, receiving a percentage of any award obtained
from fraudulent parties.40 This often represents a huge amount, and
should provide an additional financial incentive for a reluctant
whistleblower to come forward with information.
1. History of the Qui Tam Action
During the Civil War, many defense contractors submitted false
' See FINAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 103.
36 Id. at 102-03.
See id. at 103.
See id. at 111.
39 Such plaintiffs are often former employees of the violators themselves.
40 The qui tam action is a suit
brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a penalty for the commis-
sion or omission of a certain act, and provides that the same shall be recoverable in a
civil action, part of the penalty to go to any person who will bring such action and the
remainder to the state or some other institution.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (6th ed. 1990).
34 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 2
claims to the United States government. In 1863, Congress passed the
False Claims Act to provide sanctions against these contractors.4 These
Lincoln Laws remained virtually unchanged until 1986. One of the Pack-
ard Commission's recommendations was to amend the False Claims Act."'
Congress followed the recommendations and provided stiffer criminal and
civil penalties for violators. The act also amended the infrequently used
qui tam provisions. Qui tam, meaning literally "who as well," stands for
the proposition that private plaintiffs can bring an action against parties
trying to defraud the government, even if the government itself does not
wish to bring the suit.
The qui tam plaintiff has to notify the Department of Justice (DoJ)
of the alleged violation. 43 The DoJ then decides whether to join the ac-
tion. Regardless of whether or not the DoJ joins the action, if the pro-
ceedings result in a verdict against the contractor, the qui tam plaintiff is
entitled to a percentage of the reward.
2. The Amendments of 1986
The 1986 amendments made it even more desirable to become a qui
tam plaintiff. The amendments standardized the burden of proof, by re-
quiring qui tam plaintiffs to establish their cases by a preponderance of
the evidence.4 Before the amendments, courts were split as to whether a
preponderance or the higher "clear and convincing" standard was appro-
priate.4 5 The 1986 amendments also awarded the qui tam plaintiff a
higher percentage of the ultimate award, plus reasonable attorneys fees.
Prior to the 1986, qui tam plaintiffs were entitled to a maximum of
twenty-five percent if the government refused to become involved, and
ten percent if the government did become involved. After the False
Claims Act was amended, these percentages changed to: (1) no less than
twenty-five, and no more than thirty percent, if the government did not
become involved, and (2) no less than fifteen and no greater than twenty
five percent if the government did involve itself in the suit.46
If the DoJ becomes a party, it is considered the primary participant
of the lawsuit. While qui tam plaintiffs may only play a secondary role,
41 See False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 696 (1863).
"z See FINAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 111.
" See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1990). See generally Oparil, The Coming
Impact of the Amended False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L. REV. 525, 525-30 (1989) (describing
qui tam procedure).
" See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3731(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
41 Compare Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d.723, 727 (8th Cir. 1985) (advocating
"preponderance" standard) with United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1979)
(upholding "clear and convincing" standard).
" See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
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they can still object to proposed settlements if they believe that the
amounts are unreasonably low. In Gravitt v. General Electric Corpora-
tion,4 7 a former G. E. employee reported an incident of government waste
being committed by that company to the DoJ. The DoJ became involved,
later agreeing to settle the case with the defendant for $234,000. The qui
tam plaintiff, Mr. Gravitt, complained that the amount was inordinately
low. The presiding judge rejected the deal and allowed Mr. Gravitt to
continue prosecution of the claim. Mr. Gravitt's attorney settled three
combined lawsuits against G.E. for $3.5 million.48 Mr. Gravitt's share of
the settlement was $770,000, representing twenty-two percent of the re-
covery. The amount was less than the twenty-five percent minimum be-
cause it occurred prior to the 1986 amendments.
Without the qui tam provisions in the False Claims Act, so-called
"whistleblowers" risk losing their jobs with little in the way of incentive.
Through the Act, particularly the 1986 amendments, Congress has pro-
vided a financial inducement for private parties, especially those em-
ployed in the defense industry, to make the government aware of poten-
tially fraudulent situations.
CONCLUSION
The Packard Commission recommended system-wide changes in the
defense-contracting industry to minimize military procurement abuses.
Many of these recommendations have been implemented by both defense
contractors and the government. While no single change will protect the
system against corruption, an entire ethics arsenal will give the taxpayer
maximum protection. For contractors, these ethical weapons should in-
clude: (1) the setting of realistic goals for their employees which can be
achieved with aggressive, but ethical tactics; (2) adoption of a Code of
Ethics, which would become a part of the corporate culture of the organi-
zation; (3) conducting ethics training programs, stressing corporate com-
mitment to moral standards; (4) rewarding ethical behavior, while investi-
gating and punishing that considered unethical; and (5) giving increased
authority to internal auditors to detect ethical violators. For the govern-
ment, it is recommended to: (1) continue vigilance in overseeing defense
contractors, awarding defense contracts to the best contractor, not the
one with the best consultant; (2) treat those who voluntarily disclose vio-
lations more leniently than those who do not; (3) encourage internal au-
diting by randomly utilizing the investigative subpoena; (4) do not invoke
automatic suspension merely upon indictment, but use this sanction only
" 680 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ohio), afi'd, 848 F.2d 190 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901
(1988).
" See Strasser, When the Big Whistle Blows ... NAT'L L. J., May 8, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
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against violators which are not presently engaged in responsible business
practices; and (5) foster a partnership, rather than an adversarial rela-
tionship with defense contractors, in order to encourage self-policing.
Operation Ill Wind has damaged the relationship between govern-
ment and industry. Contractors can improve this relationship by increas-
ing their true commitment to total ethical management. Once the defense
industry takes this seriously, there will be less need for government regu-
lation and future "ill winds" may become rare events.
